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The new global corporate tax principle: ‘value
creation’
In 2013, after a period of growing public concern over the apparent scale of
corporate tax abuse, a new international corporate tax norm emerged as if from
nowhere. The global corporate tax base, at least insofar as it takes the form of profits
arising to multinational enterprises (MNEs) was to be allocated between jurisdictions
in accordance with where ‘value’ is ‘created’. This new norm of ‘value creation’ was
expressly promulgated in terms in a G20 announcement, and adopted by the OECD
as the guiding principle for its project to reform the international tax system: the
‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’ (BEPS) project. But at no stage was it explained
what ‘value creation’ actually meant in this context.
Transfer pricing and the inadequacy of marginalism
An informal consensus emerged in due course to the effect that ‘value creation’
was nothing other than a synonym of ‘economic substance’, but this idea was not
grounded in any formal theory of value. And nor could it have been, if prevailing
economic orthodoxies are to be maintained. Modern mainstream ‘marginalist’ value
theory is, in essence, a theory of how prices come into being in idealised markets. It
doesn’t really have anything to say about ‘economic substance’.
As things stand, the core principle which serves to allocate between jurisdictions
the corporate tax base insofar as it arises to multinational enterprises is the ‘arm’s
length principle’. The arm’s length principle provides that the pricing of an intra-
group transaction (‘transfer pricing’) should correspond to the pricing at which the
transaction would take place between independent enterprises. In other words, the
outcome of the mechanism is already meant to be the same as the outcome that
marginalist value theory would deliver: essentially, a market price. And that outcome
is the one that, in practice, yields huge pools of untaxed offshore profitability in the
hands of MNEs. To look to modern mainstream value theory as a guiding principle
underpinning the concept of ‘economic substance’, in a context where the arm’s
length principle is already being applied, would therefore simply beg the question.
By way of a simplified illustration, to show how this plays out in practice, suppose an
MNE avoids tax by situating its intellectual property in a subsidiary in a tax haven.
This means that all its subsidiaries in countries where it does substantive business
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pay tax-deductible royalties to their tax haven subsidiary, and tax is thereby avoided.
If the royalties are excessively high then transfer pricing regimes will bring them
down, but marginalist value theory is not going to bring them down any further;
in principle it should bring them down to more or less the same point. If we are
confident that a shell company acting as a formal conduit for intellectual property
revenues does not display ‘economic substance’, then no doubt we should reform
global corporate tax norms so as to allocate the tax base away from the tax haven,
but we won’t know where to allocate the tax base to instead, if we only know where
‘economic substance’ is absent, and not where ‘value creation’ is present.
To make matters worse, in the context of web-based giants such as Facebook,
Amazon, and Google, the impulse to allocate profits to jurisdictions in proportions
broadly commensurate with volumes of sales or numbers of users in those
jurisdictions has blown the question of what ‘value creation’ means wide open. It has
been modish in some technocratic circles to go beyond talking about, say, network
effects, and assert that value itself is created by consumers. This proposition,
which has even been advanced by the OECD in some of its output on the topic
of corporate tax reform, is inferentially an outright rejection of marginalism. The
activities which are said to ‘create value’ in this context – interactions on Facebook;
leaving reviews on Amazon – are simply not the market interactions yielding a price
between the participants that marginalism exists to describe.
The classical alternative
So absent any answers from mainstream marginalism, what does value theory in
the classical tradition of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Karl Marx have to say
about this? The answer is … well it isn’t entirely clear. Ultimately, this absence
of clarity in the classical tradition as it stands today stems from some simplifying
modelling assumptions seemingly made in the manuscript of Volume III of Marx’s
Capital, which gave rise to a problem within Marxian economics (arguably a defect
in Marx’s model, but perhaps only a problem of interpretation for Marxists) known
as the transformation problem. Solutions to the transformation problem abound,
but the most parsimonious and mathematically satisfactory solution, which was
developed by 20th century economist Piero Sraffa and his ‘neo-Ricardian’ school of
followers, involves simply abandoning the core classical axiom that value derives
from labour. This development led to a crisis in classical value theory over the
course of the 1970s, which could have had a really interesting outcome, except that
the subsequent neoclassical takeover in institutional economics meant that both
sides of the debate lost by dint of finding themselves to be out of a job.
Given the equation-heavy nature of the debate and the political importance of the
labour theory of value, it is not surprising that the Marxists who still had jobs in the
aftermath of this crisis – sociologists, philosophers, literary critics &c – subsequently
cleaved towards heterodox readings of Marx for which the specifically quantitative
content of the value theory was either irrelevant (the ‘value-form’ approach) or
positively and expressly repudiated (the ‘postoperaist’ reading). So where does
that leave a participant in the debate over international corporate tax norms who,
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perceiving marginalism to be useless in this context, turns to classical theory instead
to find out where ‘value’ is ‘created’? Sraffa and his followers cannot help them
since, as mentioned above, their value-theoretical approach is agnostic as to the
source of value, which means Marx is the only game in town. So here is a brief guide
to the various schools of Marxian value theory generally encountered today, and
what they would say about the distribution of the global corporate tax base if they
were adopted as the theoretical basis for the OECD’s work in this area:
A corporate tax reformer’s guide to Marxist value
theory
(1) Traditional Marxism treats value as something which is produced by labour
in production and which is subsequently embodied in commodities at exchange,
with the consequence that vast amounts of activity which appear to be implicated in
profitability – design and advertising, for example – are not treated as value creating
in this framework. Marx used a vivid analogy to explain the role of certain forms
of labour that appear to be implicated in profitability but are not value creating –
that of a match lighting a fire. The fire’s heat is caused by the match but does not
come from it, likewise the profitability in commodities may be caused by design
and marketing but the value comes from those who physically manufacture and
transport them. On this view, an MNE which produces commodities should see
its profitability allocated for tax purposes to the jurisdictions where it has physical
plant and machinery (and perhaps also, depending on the economic geography,
further upstream in global value chains to the jurisdictions where its suppliers have
plant and machinery). And in the case of MNEs which do not produce material
commodities at all, profitability should all be allocated upstream in the global value
chains to which is attached. So, for example, if you buy a dress that was advertised
to you on Facebook, Facebook’s profitability in respect of the advertising fees
should be allocated for tax purposes to where the dress was made (and the cotton
produced, and the logistics effected &c), even though none of this took place within
the Facebook group. On the face of it this would require ripping up the global
corporate tax rulebook altogether, because Facebook would not necessarily have
a taxable presence in the upstream jurisdictions in question – but that is equally
what is involved in existing proposals to allocate profitability downstream in global
value chains to where users and consumers are situated. In practice what would be
required in order to allocate the tax base upstream would be states taxing MNEs
where they make money, and then making fiscal transfers to states where production
takes place.
(2) ‘Value-form’ Marxism takes a more philosophical approach, essentially treating
the problems with which mainstream Marxism concerns itself as originating in
a mistaken reading of Marx as an economist rather than as a critic of political
economy. This approach is characterised by a concern with Marx’s debt to Hegel,
and a foregrounding of Marx’s more abstract discussions of value such as those to
be found in volume I of Capital. It began to develop in the 1960s, evolving from a
renewed focus on Marx’s own writings (including manuscript sources) as opposed
to the received texts that come to us via, in particular, Engels. For present purposes
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the key feature of this school is its focus (which it shares with marginalism) on the
moment of exchange as the point at which value is brought into being. Labour still
has a central role but the distinctions drawn in traditional Marxism between value-
producing and non-value-producing labour fall away: any kind of wage labour is in
some sense value producing provided there is a monetary exchange at the end of
it. So this school of thought (though it has hugely important insights to offer in other
contexts!) is as hopeless for present purposes as marginalism: like marginalism
it replicates the problem of transfer pricing, leaving the offshore pools of untaxed
corporate profitability in place.
(3) ‘Postoperaism’ is a more recent development. It originated in Italian activist
circles in the latter part of the twentieth century and it is highly influential outside
the academy, underpinning much popular critique of capitalism from the turn of
the twenty-first century onwards. It foregrounds Marx’s earlier writings (particularly
Grundrisse) and its focus is on features of actually existing capitalism which are
said to anticipate a post-capitalist future in which value is abolished. Like value-form
Marxism it departs from the idea found in traditional Marxism to the effect that the
utility or desirability of things is a mere trigger for the value-crystallising moment of
exchange but, in contrast to value-form Marxism, it drops the requirement that the
salient labour for bringing about that utility or desirability is necessarily (from a value-
theoretical perspective at least) wage labour. It views value as being produced by
all of us, insofar as we contribute (through our participation in it) to the social and
cultural environment of actually existing capitalism. To that extent therefore it is
intriguingly similar to the aforementioned modish theories to the effect that users
in the digital economy create value. Quantitatively, postoperaism has nothing to
say about where value is created: it holds that, owing to the infinite replicability of
the immaterial, value can no longer be treated as a quantitative relation. But its
focus on the participation of consumers in value creation suggests that, if treated
as the basis for corporate tax reform, it would align with allocating profitability
downstream in global value chains to where consumption takes place. Which from
a quantitative perspective would allocate profitability predominantly to the already
wealthy jurisdictions of the Global North.
(4) Marxist feminism departs from mainstream Marxism in order to accommodate
the phenomenon of unpaid labour in the sphere of social reproduction. Over the
course of the 1970s there was a debate as to the role played (or not played) in the
Marxist value-theoretical schema by such labour, and the conclusion is generally
understood to be that it is not necessary to intervene in the value-theoretical core
of the Marxist critique of capitalism in order to foreground the reproductive sphere.
Nonetheless, since unpaid reproductive labour relieves capital of costs which might
otherwise be borne by it, perhaps through higher wages but more likely through
taxes and onward welfare provision by the state, the risks and burdens of unpaid
reproductive labour are quantitatively implicated in capitalist surplus. Given the
uneven geographical distribution of the fiscal resources that might relieve those risks
and burdens, this would probably mean a degree of alignment between a Marxist
feminist view and the traditional Marxist position as regards where profitability
should be allocated to for tax purposes i.e. upstream in global value chains to the
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jurisdictions where material production takes place; predominantly, in other words,
the less wealthy jurisdictions of the Global South.
Conclusion: value theory matters
These brief generalisations are just that, but the underlying point is a serious one:
whether we like it or not, our apparent value-theoretical commitments involve
taking positions on real world topics with world-spanning distributional significance.
The offshore profits of the digital economy are vast reserves of wealth waiting for
redistribution, and from the point of view of relieving global inequality the difference
between leaving them where they are (as both marginalism and value-form Marxism
might suggest), distributing them to jurisdictions where consumption takes place (as
postoperaism might suggest), and distributing them to jurisdictions where material
production takes place (as both traditional and feminist Marxisms might suggest), is
commensurately vast.
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